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Abstract
Aim: Previous economic literature on the cost-effectiveness of antiretroviral treatment (ART) programs has been mainly
focused on the microeconomic consequences of alternative use of resources devoted to the fight against the HIV pandemic.
We rather aim at forecasting the consequences of alternative scenarios for the macroeconomic performance of countries.
Methods: We used a micro-simulation model based on individuals aged 15–49 selected from nationally representative
surveys (DHS for Cameroon, Tanzania and Swaziland) to compare alternative scenarios : 1-freezing of ART programs to
current levels of access, 2- universal access (scaling up to 100% coverage by 2015, with two variants defining ART eligibility
according to previous or current WHO guidelines). We introduced an ‘‘artificial’’ ageing process by programming methods.
Individuals could evolve through different health states: HIV negative, HIV positive (with different stages of the syndrome).
Scenarios of ART procurement determine this dynamics. The macroeconomic impact is obtained using sample weights that
take into account the resulting age-structure of the population in each scenario and modeling of the consequences on total
growth of the economy.
Results: Increased levels of ART coverage result in decreasing HIV incidence and related mortality. Universal access to ART
has a positive impact on workers’ productivity; the evaluations performed for Swaziland and Cameroon show that universal
access would imply net cost-savings at the scale of the society, when the full macroeconomic consequences are introduced
in the calculations. In Tanzania, ART access programs imply a net cost for the economy, but 70% of costs are covered by
GDP gains at the 2034 horizon, even in the extended coverage option promoted by WHO guidelines initiating ART at levels
of 350 cc/mm
3 CD4 cell counts.
Conclusion: Universal Access ART scaling-up strategies, which are more costly in the short term, remain the best economic
choice in the long term. Renouncing or significantly delaying the achievement of this goal, due to ‘‘legitimate’’ short term
budgetary constraints would be a misguided choice.
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Introduction
In its strategy for 2011–2015, UNAIDS states that ‘‘a renewed
advocacy effort must be launched to encourage the continued
commitment of the global North to support development efforts in
the global South, with a focus on long-term predictable financing,
particularly through multilateral mechanisms’’ [1]. Indeed follow-
ing the 2001 Declaration of Commitment of the United Nations
General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) and
its further 2006 recommendation to scale up services and
interventions ‘‘towards the goal of providing universal access to
HIV prevention, treatment and care by 2015’’, global funding for
HIV programs has spectacularly increased from US$ 1.4 billion in
2000 to 15.6 billion in 2009. It is estimated that approximately
70% of total spending for HIV in low and middle-income
countries comes in the form of international assistance [2].
Significant advances in the fight against the pandemic have been
obtained from these efforts. Globally, HIV infections are fewer
now than ten years ago, reflecting several factors that include the
natural course of the epidemic and the impact of HIV prevention
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middle-income countries were reported to be receiving antiretro-
viral treatment (ART), including eight countries providing ART to
at least 80% of patients in need and 21 additional ones with
coverage rates higher than 50%, an achievement that would not
have been deemed possible five years ago [3]. Progress has been
most noticeable in sub-Saharan Africa the world’s region most
hardly hit by the epidemic [4].
In the context of the worst financial and economic crisis since
the 1930’s, there are growing concerns that global HIV funding
will be flat-lined or even reduced in the next future [5]. Short-term
sustainability of scaling up ART coverage to reach universal access
is particularly under question since WHO 2010 recommendations
to initiate ART at an earlier stage of the disease have mechanically
increased the number of people eligible for treatment from an
estimated 10.1 million to 14.6 million worldwide [6], and since
growing number of patients are in need of more expensive new
first-line and second-line antiretroviral regimens [7]. Pledges by
governments and private donors for the 2011–2013 third
voluntary replenishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), although amounting to
US$ 11.7 billion, fell short of the minimum target set by the
GFATM (US$ 13 billion) and from its own needs estimates to
keep on track with the goal of universal access in 2015 (US$ 18–
20 billion) [8]. As acknowledged by the Executive Director of
GFATM, ‘‘the replenishment will enable further significant scale
up, but not at the same pace as in recent years and is insufficient to
meet anticipated demand’’ [9]. Moreover, the fiscal-year 2011
budget of the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPfAR), the other major donor for funding of ART, proposes
only a 2% increase, which may result in future treatment
enrollment freezes [10]. Indeed, the long-term sustainability and
economic rationale of scaling up access to ART is increasingly
questioned in both academic and policy circles [11]. Exploring the
macroeconomic impact on GDP growth and human development
of renouncing to -or delaying- the goal of universal access to HIV
care and treatment is therefore key for ‘‘making sense of the
money’’ devoted to HIV by bilateral and multilateral donor
programs [12].
In previous economic literature, there have been a number of
exercises aimed at estimating future funding needs for scaling up
HIV programs in low and middle income countries based on
extrapolation of current expenditures and epidemiologic modeling
[13,14]. On the other hand, there have been macroeconomic
estimations of the impact of HIV/AIDS integrating epidemiolog-
ical dynamics into neoclassical or ‘‘endogenous growth’’ models
[15–18]. However, proper estimates of the economic impact of
alternative funding scenarios for HIV treatment have to be based
on the potential consequences of each scenario for the future life-
history of affected individuals and, jointly, on an aggregation of
these effects for the whole dynamics of the economy. This is now
made possible by the availability of individual data on socio-
economic characteristics and health-seeking behaviors of nation-
ally representative population samples through Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS) and the use of dynamic micro-simulation
methods[19]. To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to
compare the long term (mid 2030’s) economic consequences of
two archetypal ‘‘extreme’’ scenarios for funding access to ART:
the UNGASS inspired universal access scenario (scaling-up to
100% coverage by 2015, with two variants defining ART
eligibility according to previous or current WHO guidelines),
versus a ‘‘freezing’’ scenario in which the currently observed ART
coverage is maintained without further increase in ART provision.
This modeling exercise was carried out in the case of three African
countries where high-quality DHS were available and which differ
in terms of HIV prevalence and current level of wealth:
Cameroon, Tanzania and Swaziland. Per capita Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) ranges from US$ 347 in Tanzania and US$ 906 in
Cameroon, to US$ 2659 for Swaziland [20]. In Cameroon and
Tanzania HIV prevalence rates are relatively high but lower than
Swaziland where it is one of the highest in the world [2].
Materials and Methods
Overview
To estimate the future impact of the HIV epidemic under
different levels of ART procurement in Cameroon, Swaziland and
Tanzania, the following steps were carried out.
1. We design a micro-simulation model based on individuals aged
15–49 selected from nationally representative surveys. By this
process each individual may be seen as ‘‘representative’’ of a
portion of the general population of the country.
2. We introduced an ‘‘artificial’’ ageing process, by computer
programming methods. Individuals could evolve through four
different health states: HIV negative, HIV positive (with two
stages of the disease) and death. Four ART procurement
scenarios determine these dynamics through their consequenc-
es on survival rates of the affected population and on infection
rates in the general population: No Access (S0), Aid Freeze (S1),
Universal Access (all patients with CD4 cell counts ,200/
ml)(S2a), and Extended Universal Access (all patients with CD4
cell counts ,350/ml) (S2b).
3. At the end of the artificial ageing process, we created a
‘‘picture’’ for each given country in the mid-2030’s not only in
terms of ART need and procurement, lives saved, and HIV
infections prevented (compared to S0), but also in terms of
macroeconomic aggregates, derived for each scenario (costs
and economic benefits). The macroeconomic impact is
obtained using sample weights that take into account the
resulting age-structure of the population in each scenario.
Datasources: Representative Agents
The simulations of this paper are based on three databases from
the worldwide MEASURE Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) program: the Tanzania HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey
2003–04 (THIS), the Cameroon Demographic and Health Survey
2004 (EDSC), and the Swaziland Demographic and Health
Survey 2006–07 (SDHS) [21–23].THIS, SDHS and EDSC are
the first nationwide surveys to provide HIV prevalence estimates:
in addition to the data collected through interviews, respondents
aged 15–49 were asked to voluntary provide a blood sample for
subsequent HIV testing (regardless the severity of HIV). The HIV
testing protocols have been approved by ORC Macro ethical
comity. They were based on the anonymous linked protocol
developed by DHS, which allows for the linking of the HIV test
results to the socio-demographic data, provided that information
potentially identifying an individual is destroyed before the linking
takes place. Among all respondents, 80.5% in Tanzania (TZ),
82.7% in Swaziland (SZ) and 91.0% in Cameroon (CM) agreed to
participate to the HIV testing protocol. The sampling procedure
was determined before HIV testing agreement in order to avoid
biases in the representativeness of the general population. Besides,
non-participation to the HIV testing protocol has been shown to
have negligible bias on HIV prevalence estimates [21–23].The
final samples for the simulations comprised 10,747 individuals in
TZ, 8,187 observations in SZ and 9,751 records in CM,
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(divided into two stages, asymptomatic and symptomatic; see
Appendix S1 for methodology).
Ageing Process: A Micro-Simulation Model
An individual’s future health status was forecasted using a
discrete-time micro-simulation model. In the model, an individual
is, at a given period, either HIV negative (HIV2) in the
asymptomatic stage of HIV (HIV+), in the symptomatic stage of
HIV (HIV++) or deceased (D). At a time t, an individual is
described by his/her health status. At the next period t+1 (one
period lasting 5 years), the same person’s health status is
determined by a transition rate matrix –age and gender specific-
according to his/her previous health status. This Markovian
process can be summarized by Figure 1. We opted for five years
periods in the model shorter intervals (e.g. one year).Indeed, DHS
exhibit considerable sampling variations and non-robustness
which could lead to spurious annual transition rates. It would
follow that results at the 2040 horizon, resulting from 30
simulation cycles, may be severely biased.
Appendix S1 describes how we compute each transition
probability Pk;j (the probabilities of going from HIV2 to
HIV2(P00), from HIV2 to HIV+ (P01), etc). HIV being a chronic
and ‘‘progressive’’ disease, the probabilities of going from HIV+ to
HIV2 (P10), from HIV++ to HIV2 (P20) and from HIV++ to
HIV+ (P21) are null. P33is equal to 1 (death being an absorbing
state).
An essential characteristic of our micro modelling is that this set
of probabilities changes along with the policy scenario (e.g., P23,
probability from HIV++ to death, is reduced in the case of access
to treatment). They are computed on the basis of DHS surveys
and litterature estimates (e.g. WHO/UNAIDS estimates of the
HIV epidemic[2]; refer to Appendix S1 for details on the
methodology).
During the simulation process, individuals becoming older than
54 are removed from the simulation sample (i.e. those aged 45–49
in the initial period are censored after the second period, those
aged 40–44 in the first period are censored after the third
period,…), as we cannot establish transition probabilities nor the
future of these age groups. When the ‘‘oldest’’ cohort (aged 50–54
in t) is censored in t+5 it is automatically replaced by the preceding
cohort (aged 45-49 in t, becoming 50–54 in t+5). This issue is
similar for the youngest cohort (aged 15–19 in t, becoming 20–24
in t+5). A new cohort of individuals aged 15–19, taken from the
original DHS dataset, is introduced at every time period in the
simulation sample to mimic real-life population dynamics. In order
to take into account the demographic evolution, the 15–19
population’s five-year growth rate is estimated and allows us to
include a new ‘‘demographic-adjusted size’’ cohort at each period
(see Table 1 for values) [24].
Microsimulating the impact of ART Procurement
Strategies
Micro-simulation methods allowed us to compare two ARV
access scenarios: ‘‘Aid Freeze’’ (S1) and ‘‘Universal Access’’ (S2),
the latter being broken down into two scenarios -whether 2006 (for
S2a) or 2010 (for S2b, ‘‘Extended Universal Access’’) ART
eligibility criteria are considered [25,26]. The WHO recom-
mended in 2006 that HIV infected people with a CD4 cell count
#200 cells/ml, those in clinical stage III with a CD4 cell count
#350 cells/ml and those with a diagnosis of WHO stage IV disease
should start ART [25]. Since 2010 the WHO recommends that
people with a CD4 cell count #350 cells/ml should start ART
regardless of the presence or absence of clinical symptoms and that
those with a diagnosis of WHO stage III or IV should start ART
irrespective of their CD4 cell count [26]. These scenarios are
contrasted between each other, but also versus a baseline scenario
(‘‘No Access’’, S0) which provides a picture of what the world
would have looked like if ARVs procurement had not been
introduced in the three studied countries and remained null during
the whole period. ‘‘No-Access’’ and ‘‘Universal Access’’ scenarios
can be considered as hypothetical boundary scenarios: the
‘‘Universal Access’’ scenarios –i.e. all those who need ART have
access to it- show what could happen if the scaling-up of ART
program was achieved in 2015. In S2b, the target population is
1.49 times greater than in S2a [27]: in addition to every HIV++
individual under ART in S2a, an additional subset of the HIV+
population with higher CD4 cell counts (200,CD4,350) receives
ARVs. The ‘‘Aid-Freeze’’ scenario represents what could be the
extreme consequences of renouncing to further ART scale up due
to the budgetary constraints of the financial crisis: the current
number of PLWHIV receiving ARVs remains constant (i.e. a
‘‘freeze’’ in the absolute number of ARV treatments delivered).
Thanks to the explicit modeling of individual ageing we can
include the consequences of each scenario for the future life-
history of individuals. Roughly speaking, we deform the transition
matrix in order to capture the main effects of a program. HIV++
individuals live longer when receiving ARVs, and the earlier they
start ART, the higher their survival rate is (see Appendix S1 and
Table 1). Moreover ARVs do not only reduce mortality: when a
Figure 1. State transition diagram of the Markov chain. Ellipses define the four different health states of the model (HIV2, HIV+, HIV++ and
Death). The dashed arrows represent the probabilities of going from one state to another in the subsequent period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034101.g001
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scenarios S2a and S2b, ART is also thought to have a preventative
effect, in terms of an individual’s infectiousness, which is negatively
correlated to the delay between HIV infection and ART initiation
[28]. This reduction in HIV2transmission rates (Q, see Appen-
dix S1) is thus assumed to be higher in S2b than in S2a. For
instance, the baseline infection probabilities are multiplied by one
in S2a (a conservative assumption) and by 0.3 in S2b (a rather
optimistic hypothesis; Table 1). The outcomes’ sensitivity to these
assumptions will also be assessed.
Economic assumptions
When assessing the cost-benefit of a healthcare program, the
costs and benefits components must be determined. The latter
component can include two aspects: the gains in the economic
production and those attached with better health outcomes. This
paper being driven by an accounting approach, we only measure
the economic benefit as production gains.
DHS include a module on respondents’ employment status:
male and female aged 15 and above were asked whether they were
working in the 7 days preceding the interview. We propose to
estimate probabilities of participating to the labor market and to
integrate this dynamic behavior into the micro-simulation model.
Using a binary Logit model, labor participation is explained by the
respondent’s age group and gender (Table 1). Employment rate is
a concave function of age and is higher among men than among
women. Several authors examined the impact of HIV on
economic activity in terms of productivity loss [29–32]. Regarding
these works, we assume that compared to HIV2 workers
(exhibiting a null absenteeism rate), HIV+ individuals (asymptom-
atic stage) are not statistically more absent, while HIV++
(symptomatic without ART) workers are 25% more absent (but
solely 5% more absent with ART; Table 1). Although the impact
of HIV on productivity may be more severe as individuals get
older, the model’s absenteeism rates were assumed age-invariant
due to the lack of appropriate calibration data. The age-gender
specific employment rates were then multiplied by health
condition-specific presence-at-work rates to obtain individual
productivity rates.
We also estimate country-specific maximal average incomes per
working adult (at full productivity rate) by dividing the national
GDP by the number of working adults aged 15–49 in the country
Table 1. Model Key Parameters.
Parameter Swaziland Tanzania Cameroon
Demographic 15–-24 Population Growth Rate 14.18% 13.56% 11.71%
15–-49 Population (In Thousands) 582 16,220 7,708
Sample Weights 71 1,521 790
Sample Sizes 8,187 10,747 9,751
Economics Employment rates: Age [15–-19] Reference
Estimated Age [20–-24] 1.538 1.339 1.299
Coefficients from the Age [25–-29] 2.378 2.284 2.025
Logit Model Age [30–-34] 2.649 2.514 2.618
Age [35–39] 2.836 2.702 2.929
Age [40–44] 2.696 2.934 3.094
Age [45–49] 2.691 2.677 2.977
Woman 20.7567 -0.369 20.596
Intercept 21.580 0.196 20.663
Absenteeism Rates HIV 2 100%
HIV+ 100%
HIV++ w/ ART 95%
HIV++ w/o ART 75%
GDP at Market Price In billions USD 2.648 11.351 15.775
Annual Avg. Wage Per Worker $10,381 $870 $3,223
Epidemiology t (ART need; 2006 Guidelines ) 31.05% 30.00% 29.91%
TC (ART coverage; 2006 Guidelines ) T0 (Initial Stage) 42.37% 0.71% 8.75%
T0-T1 Unknown 16% 18%
T1 (First Period) Unknown 31% 26%
a (HIV history) 0.1
v (HIV+ Mortality Gap) 0.005
u (HIV++ Mortality Gap) 0.2 for S1 & S2a ; 0.1 for S2b
c ( HIV Diffusion Parameter) 0.518 0.388 0.511
Q (Prevention Parameter) 0f o rS1 & S2a ; 0.7 for S2b
b (Transition Booster) 1.30 1.27 1.30
y (Transition Restrainer) 0.7 for asymptomatic patients ; 1 otherwise
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034101.t001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e34101(Table 1) [20,24]. The product between productivity rates &
potential income provides a vector of age/gender & health
condition specific wages that reproduce GDP per capita national
levels. Aggregate GDP levels were computed by aggregating
individual wages (multiplied by the representative weight of each
observation, i.e. the number of ‘‘real’’ agents one DHS interviewee
represents). GDP dynamics only result in the microsimulation
model from epidemiologic and demographic changes: no exoge-
nous GDP growth rate is included (a conservative assumption).
In order to compute program costs, we assume for all three
scenarios that patients receive first-line ARVs for five years (210$
per patient per year) before receiving second-line ARVs until their
death (590$ per patient per year) [33,34]. In developing countries,
1.9% of 1
st line drugs patients switch to 2
nd line regimens each
year [35]. Thus the model’s regimens switching rate is probably
overestimated, even for the future (after 2015). However, this
assumption is voluntary conservative: the lower the switching rate,
the lower programs associated costs would be. Laboratory tests
(191$ per patient per year) and service delivery costs (72$) were
also included in the costs component [34]. We do not make any
additional hypothesis about ART characteristics in the future e.g.
price variations, innovative or more effective treatment strategies,
etc. Yet, the decreasing trend of ARVs prices suggests that our cost
data may over-estimate future costs [33,36]. The total cost of each
scenario can be computed by aggregating individual costs and will
be used for the macro-economic evaluation.
Figure 2. Life Paths. Simulated health trajectories of a THIS 03–04 subsample as per the four ART procurement scenarios. In columns 2009/
13,…,2034/38, the full-white circles refer to individuals being HIV negative at a given period, the one-quarter black circles to HIV+, the three-quarter
black circles to HIV++ and the full-black circles to deceased individuals. The ART circles columns provide information on whether or not individuals
are treated with ARVs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034101.g002
Figure 3. HIV prevalence rates. Evolution of HIV prevalence rates overtime in the three studied countries as per the four hypothetical ART access
scenarios.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034101.g003
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e34101Health and macroeconomic outcomes
The micro-simulation model offers a large panel of outcomes,
providing public health and economic ‘‘snapshots’’ for each
country and each five-year period: in addition to several
epidemiological indicators (number of deaths averted, HIV
prevalent and incident cases (and prevented cases), and treatment
need; see Table 2), program characteristics and associated
economic outcomes were estimated for the alternative scenarios
(volume of ARV procurement, programs’ costs and economic
benefits; see Table 3). Time series of GDP and GDP gains (relative
to S0) are computed for each alternative scenario by using
standard aggregations methods throughout the surviving agents
(the age-structure of the population and the total labor supply are
endogenously determined by the aging process).
In order to compare the ART access scenarios with the
counterfactual S0 (no access to ART) in terms of economic
sustainability, the common indicator ‘‘self-financing ratio’’ (SFR)
was computed –the quotient between the total economic gains
generated by treating HIV-infected workers and its associated
costs. Therefore, a SFR superior to 1 means that the HIV program
is cost-saving: its net contribution to the economy is positive
because its global macroeconomic benefit is superior to its total
costs. Alternatively, a SFR inferior to 1 means the program has a
net cost for the economy but this does not necessarily means it is
not worthwhile since this net cost translates, beyond its
macroeconomic impact on GDP, in welfare improvements due
to increase in life expectancy and quality of life of the HIV-
infected population.
Results
Microsimulation of life paths: an illustration
Figure 2 presents health trajectories from a THIS 2003–04
subsample according to the four alternative scenarios. This ageing
process creates one possible future from many others for every
DHS representative agent (the Markov process is a random
process). Individual No. 116 is a man aged between 20 and
24 years in 2009; he contracts HIV in 2019 in scenarios S0, S1 &
S2a. He progresses to advanced HIV in 2024 and receives ARVs
solely in S2a (he lives one more period than in S0 & S1). If the S2b
program had been set up, he would never have contracted HIV
(preventative effect of ART Q . 0) and would have died in 2034
from other causes than HIV. Individual No. 3,518 is a HIV++
woman in 2009. She dies in the subsequent period in S0 & S1.
With S2a & S2b she remains under ART until her death (due to
ART failure or external causes), respectively in 2024 and 2029.
Individual No. 6,074 is HIV+ at the initial stage. She meets 2010
eligibility criteria in the 2
nd period and starts ART in S2b. In the
subsequent period she shifts to HIV++ and obtains ART in S2a,
before exiting from the observation window (we could not establish
transition probabilities for individuals older than 54). Individual
No. 8,055 contracts HIV between 2010 and 2014 in all scenarios
except S2b and then receives ARVs in S1 & S2a before being
censored; his observed survival is equal in all scenarios. Individual
No. 13,975 is introduced in the simulation process in 2014. He
starts ART earlier in S2b than in S2a and thus lives longer in S2b
(lower mortality with ART when initiated early). The epidemio-
logical results at national levels are based on the aggregation of all
individual simulated life paths.
Epidemiologic Impact
As shown in Table 2, not having provided ARVs (S0) would
have had a catastrophic impact on life expectancy through HIV-
related mortality: in Swaziland (SZ), 439,000 individuals would die
during the course of the simulation, 83% of them being HIV
infected at the time of death. Tanzania (TZ) would experience
3.1 million deaths over 25 years and Cameroon (CM) 1.8 million.
Compared with the absence of ART (S0), extended Universal
Access (S2b) is the scenario that saves the greatest number of lives
(238,000 in SZ –i.e. 54% of S0’s deaths are avoided-, 1.3 million in
TZ and 598,000 in CM), followed by the Universal Access (S2a)
scenario (187,000 in SZ, 1 million in TZ and 441,000 in CM). The
‘‘Aid Freeze’’ scenario would only avoid 27,000 deaths in SZ
(respectively 155,000 & 52,000 in TZ & CM) compared with S0.
Because of the high mortality associated with HIV in the
absence of ART, a decrease in HIV prevalence rates, shown in
Figure 3, can be predicted for the ‘‘No Access’’ Scenario (S0) in the
three examined countries (by 4% in SZ,1 %i nTZ and 0?5% in
CM). Treating individuals with ART produces a mechanical
increase of HIV prevalence: HIV-infected individuals live longer,
which results in a higher number of HIV carriers than in the
scenario S0: the prevalence rate of S0 is slightly lower than in S1
but considerably lower than in S2a (Figure 3). In the Extended
Universal Access Scenario (S2b), the differential in prevalence rates
Figure 4. Self Financing Ratios. Time trends in the cost-benefit measures of ART programs in the three examined countries. The Y axis shows, on a
logarithm 10 scale, the ratio between the cumulated GDP gains (compared with the No Access scenario S0) and the ART program cumulated costs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034101.g004
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e34101due to the surviving HIV-infected population (these survival rates
are even higher in S2b than in S2a) is reversed by the reduction of
incidence: 343,000 new infections can be avoided over 30 years in
SZ, 1.8 million in TZ and 824,000 in CM over 25 years (due to the
preventive effect of the program), such that HIV prevalence is
reduced by half at the end of the micro-simulation process (it
diminishes by 13 % in SZ,3 %i nTZ and 2% in CM). Since
mortality and infection rates of HIV- individuals are equal in S0,
S1 and S2a, the cumulated numbers of new infections observed
over the simulation process are, by construction, equal across these
options.
Economic Impact
The annual costs associated with the ‘‘Aid Freeze’’ scenario
remain stable in the three countries as the number of treated
individuals remains constant (Table 3). For the Universal Access
scenario (S2a), 753 million USD would be disbursed in SZ to cover
210,000 individuals for the final period 2032–2037 (the annual
costs of the program are multiplied by 5 over 30 years), while the
expenditures reach respectively 3.7 and 1.8 billion USD in TZ and
CM for the final period (respectively three and four times the first
period’s costs). The overall spending involved by the Extended
Universal Access scenario S2b are up to 15% higher than the
previous figures. However the time-structure of these costs differs
in this latter scenario: annual costs are important in the first period
of the simulation (the program initiates ART for an increased
portion of the HIV+ population) but increase more slowly
afterwards (they only double in the three countries) as the
preventive effect of earlier treatment implies that new HIV
infections are diminished.
Due to the general growth of the economy (resulting from
demographic & epidemiological changes solely), an increase in the
GDP per capita occurs in the ‘‘No Access’’ Scenario (S0) at the end
of the micro-simulation process (by 9?8% in SZ,0 ?7% in TZ and
4?7% in CM), but GDP growth-rates are higher when ART
programs are initiated: a surplus, positively correlated with the
coverage rate of the population can be generated through
increased productivity of treated HIV-infected workers.
To what extent ART programs may be cost-saving when such
positive macroeconomic impact is taken into account? The answer
depends on the countries’ GDP levels (as ARVs prices were
assumed constant across the three countries of our modeling
exercise). For both Swaziland and Cameroon, when compared to
the counterfactual benchmark (no access to ART at all), all
scenarios of ART coverage appear to be cost saving: the
production gains they allow are higher than their cumulated costs
(as shown in Figure 4, the self-financing ratios exceed 100% in CM
and SZ). In both countries, the aid freeze scenario (S1) is the most
cost saving at the beginning of the simulation but after 2030, the
extended universal access scenario (S2b) provides the maximal net
benefit and dominates (in terms of SFR) the other scenarios in the
long run (Figure 4 and Table 3). In Tanzania, the extended
universal access scenario (S2b) also dominates over the long run.
However, since the GDP per capita is far lower than in Cameroon
and Swaziland, GDP gains compensate only partially the total
costs of ART in the three scenarios: 69% for S2b, and respectively
64% and 63% for S1 and S2a. Financing ART programs in TZ
clearly implies a net cost for the economy: only 69% of total costs
are covered by GDP gains in 2034 in S2b. However, in all
scenarios, the net-cost per life year saved is smaller than 1000$,
even when using the very conservative assumption that each life
saved only represents on average five years of additional life
expectancy.
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Scenario on the others requires further examination of the model’s
hypotheses. Indeed, this scenario has, compared to the others,
three relative advantages: the spread of the epidemic, the
progression pace to the symptomatic stage of HIV and the
mortality rate under treatment are all decreased. These three
modifications have notable effects on the number of live saved and
the self financing ratio (through program costs and/or GDP gains).
We propose here eight sensitivity tests, wherein each key
parameter from the microsimulation is altered. Table 4 provides
estimates of both SFR and lives saved -compared to S0- at the end
of the simulation process for the core analysis described previously
and the alternative stipulations in the three studied countries.
Sensitivity analyses V1-V3 weaken (separately) each relative
advantage of S2b. In V1, Q, the strength of the prevention effect,
is lowered from 0.7 to 0.5. S2b becomes less profitable than S1 (and
sometimes S2a). When y (restraining the progression to HIV++)i s
decreased from 0.3 to 0.1 in V2, S2b becomes dominated by S1
except in SZ but remains more profitable than S2a. The same
conclusion can be drawn when the mortality under ART when
initiated early, u
*, is increased from 0.1 to 0.15. We then
symmetrically assume that the mortality rates under treatment
(late initiation) are augmented from 0.2 to 0.3: S1 and S2a are even
less efficient than in the core analysis (V4). If we assume that a
preventive effect exists for S2a (raising the parameter from zero to
0?2), S2a slightly dominates S2b (and thus S1) in the long run (V5).
Thanks to the preventative effect of treatment, S2b saves additional
lives and becomes more efficient when the mortality rate of the
asymptomatic HIV population is increased (v parameter, V6). We
finally conduct two robustness tests on the microeconomic
components of the model that conserve policy rankings (a decrease
of presence rates under ART, V7, and a decrease in the price of
2
nd line HIV medicines). These eight sensitivity analyses
demonstrate two things: the financial sustainability of ART
programs is robust to any change, and seems to depend more
on the initial GDP-per-capita, rather than on the parameter used
for the transition-matrix (programs are always cost-effective in
Cameroon and Swaziland, but not in Tanzania); the precise
ranking of S1, S2a and S2b can change depending on parameter
values, but the general sketch is that S2b tends to dominate the
alternatives in the long run in terms of SFR and is anyway the
most life-saving option throughout the simulation.
Discussion
The use of micro-simulation techniques combined with the
availability of detailed data on economic behaviors at individual
levels in three African countries allowed us to forecast the impact
of alternative scenarios for access to ART throughout the whole
economy. Previous economic literature on the cost-effectiveness of
ART programs has mainly focused on the microeconomic
consequences of alternative use of resources devoted to the fight
against the HIV pandemic: trade-off between prevention and
treatment or trade-off between alternative threshold criteria for
initiating ART or switching to second line regimens [37–41].
Although such approaches are very useful to help optimize
treatment and comprehensive strategies and adapt them to low-
resource settings [42], they ignore de facto the macroeconomic
benefits induced by procuring treatment to the labor force. Our
micro-simulation based modeling improves the contribution of
economic evaluations to policy making decisions by adopting a
concept of ‘‘net total costs and benefit’’ integrating GDP-gains, as
in Resch et al. [43].
Not surprisingly, the human toll that would be paid by freezing
ART coverage at the current levels, rather than pursuing the way
forward the UNGASS goal of universal access, would be quite
enormous. In such freezing scenario, the situation in terms of
future AIDS-related deaths would not be very different in the
2030’s from the counterfactual scenario of no-access at all to ART
(by comparison, no more than 6% of additional deaths could be
avoided by the current level of coverage). In contrast, universal
access programs could save six times more lives. Our results also
show that although universal access scenarios are logically more
costly in the short term they are indeed the more cost-beneficial in
the long term, when taking into account their macroeconomic
consequences. The evaluations performed for Swaziland and
Cameroon show that Universal Access scenarios would imply net
cost-savings at the scale of the society.
The growth rate of an economy and future national wealth
depend on the choices made (i.e. the people saved have a
productive value which adds to the social value of human lives).
The extra economic value created provides funding for treatment
access programs such that Universal Access is found to be the most
economically feasible option. In purely economic terms, Universal
Access may be considered as an investment in productive human
capital, with a positive ’Keynesian-flavored’ multiplier (public
spending with higher returns than initial expenditures). Recipro-
cally, scenarios dealing with freezing programs (e.g. reduced
international aid because of the world financial crisis) despite
(initially) yielding higher tax returns generate smaller benefits in
the long term and have recessive effects on the economy.
Our results convey two additional messages to ongoing
international debates. First, they tend to confirm [44] that in
spite of the mechanical increase of direct treatment costs, the
extended coverage implied by the recent revision of WHO
guidelines, wherein ART is initiated at higher levels of CD4 cell
counts (350 cc/mm
3), is cost-effective when including its whole
macroeconomic impact. Second, they confirm that the macroeco-
nomic consequences of universal access to ART are highly
sensitive to its potential impact on HIV transmission and
consequently on the trajectory of the HIV epidemic globally
[45]. This brings an additional argument for the urgent need of
large scale randomized experiments to provide definitive data
about the impact on the epidemic of the so-called ‘‘test and treat’’
or ‘‘treatment as prevention’’ strategy [46]. Future research could
also investigate whether ‘‘test and treat’’ strategies could be
economically sustainable. As results of the present paper suggest,
the answer would notably depend on the ability of such a strategy
to reduce inter-individual transmission, patients’ mortality and
control viral load.
Of course, there are two obvious limitations when extrapolating
our results to the current situation of HIV funding. Our
estimations are limited to only three countries and may not be
valid for other African contexts. However, the three selected
countries are quite representative of the heterogeneity of the
epidemiological and economic situations in sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover, the reality of HIV funding in the next future may be
less dramatic than the extreme ‘‘freezing’’ scenario which we
selected. Despite the financial crisis, OECD figures showed
continuing progress in total net official development assistance
(ODA) in both 2008 and 2009 [47]. Significant efficiency gains in
the use of already available funding may be obtained through
improved synergies with other Millennium Development Goals-
related programs and health systems strengthening [48] and
through the use of innovations in care delivery to promote broader
healthcare reforms [49]. However, recent trends, such as the
limited 20% increase in donor pledges for the next three years for
The Economic Consequences of Rationed ART Access
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scaling up of universal access to ART is a very real one.
In addition, a number of methodological limitations should be
acknowledged. For example, individual’s behaviors included in
our modeling are quite static. We do not consider questions of
adherence or therapeutic failure in an in-depth manner: a
‘‘delivered’’ treatment in our model is one which operates with a
given percentage of efficacy (without consideration for age, illness
duration or treatment duration) and the probabilities of survival of
cohorts of agents benefitting from ART are estimated on the basis
of published results in the literature. Another limitation is that our
‘‘net cost’’ approach does not really tackle the programs’ feasibility
by countries’ healthcare systems [50]: if a nation experiences a
shortage in the health workforce, Universal Access may be
unattainable despite being budgeted and economically sustainable.
It could therefore be quite interesting to examine whether the
large procurement of treatment to the population, besides
generating GDP gains, could enhance the public-health sector.
It can also be noticed that we do not take into account the ‘‘value’’
of human life or the quality of added surviving years. A large
improvement on the current analysis could be provided by
incorporating these dimensions, mainly for countries in which the
‘‘net cost’’ remains positive (such as Tanzania). Concerning this
latter point, the model used for this analysis has the strong
advantage of being applicable to any country covered by the DHS
program (26 surveys were conducted, including 20 in Sub-Saharan
Africa). There is, then, the possibility to create a list of countries in
which programs are unambiguously cost saving, and (symmetri-
cally) a list of countries in which we must add an ethical ‘‘value of
human life’’ argument in order to advocate in favor of universal
ART access.
In spite of these limitations, the general message underlined by
our results is that scaling-up strategies for universal access to ART,
which are more costly in the short term, remain the best economic
choice in the long term. Renouncing or significantly delaying the
achievement of this goal, due to ‘‘legitimate’’ short term budgetary
constraints would be a misguided choice.
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